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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical situation: a state legislature,
seeking to fight back against corporate financial fraud, enacts an
amendment to its state whistleblower laws. This amendment requires
corporate attorneys to publicly report the past financial frauds of
their clients in certain circumstances—even when this reporting
involves the disclosure of otherwise confidential client documents.1
At first glance, the proposal may seem like it would fall within the
purview of a state legislature: the amendment deals with financial
fraud prevention and correction, and the state’s general economic
health, two commonly legislated areas of law. However, the
amendment also directly regulates the conduct of practicing
attorneys. As such, the amendment would encroach upon the
regulatory territory of state judiciary branches, which have
traditionally held themselves out as the sole arbiters of attorney
conduct.2

1. This hypothetical amendment takes the general form of actual regulations
supported by many bar associations, enacted by many state judiciaries, and
promulgated by the SEC. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014); N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2014). Individual iterations of the rule vary widely from state to state, and from
institution to institution. Cf. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014); 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(d)(2)(iii); see also infra Part II.B.
2. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation
of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 77 (2009). Many state judiciaries utilize the
“negative inherent powers” concept to support the notion that their power to
regulate attorney conduct is exclusive of other branches of government. See
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27 (1986). The negative inherent
powers doctrine suggests that because the power to regulate attorney conduct is
inherent in the judiciary under the state’s constitution, any attempt at such regulation
by a state legislature violates the separation of powers between branches. See id. For
examples of state courts applying the negative inherent powers doctrine, see Preston
v. Stoops, 373 Ark. 591, 594 (2008) (holding that a state law penalizing deceptive
trade practices did not apply to attorneys due to separation of powers concerns);
State ex rel. Doyle v. Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C., 287 Ga. 289 (2010)
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Attorney behavioral rules, commonly referred to as “rules of
professional conduct” or “ethics rules,” are typically drafted by
professional bar associations, which submit these proposed rules to
the state’s highest court for approval and enactment.3 The rules do
not become authoritative law in the relevant state unless adopted by
the state’s highest court, “which is free to draft its own rules, tinker
with the bar association proposals, or leave the field unregulated.”4
The attorney-regulation process has thus been dominated by bar
associations and, to a lesser extent, the courts, whose philosophies
and approaches to regulation have controlled the field.5
However, this drafting process has suffered from a lack of rigorous
public policy analysis.6 While public policy concerns such as
regulatory effectiveness or economic efficiency have not been wholly
ignored, scholars argue that such concerns have been overshadowed
by the extraneous effects of politics, compromise, and public opinion.7
Rule-makers’ resulting failure to adequately account for the public
policy implications of their ethics rules has had two primary effects on
those rules. First, this failure has hampered the ability of drafters to
maintain the rules’ effectiveness and relevance in a growing and
evolving legal industry.8 Second, the failure has played a role in the

(relying in part on separation of powers concerns in holding that “only this Court has
the inherent power to govern the practice of law in Georgia”).
3. Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional Responsibility Rules:
The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 57, 61 (2007).
4. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94.
5. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD 41 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that “courts frequently have deferred
or delegated authority to bar associations”); Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000—
Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 1, 4 (2001) (“For most of
the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first century . . . the ABA has controlled
the [rulemaking] process”); Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42
MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 175 (2010) [hereinafter Wald, Should Judges Regulate
Lawyers?].
6. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 678 (1989) (providing
an analysis of the “rare opportunity [the Model Rules process offers] to study the
internal politics of the bar”); see also David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine

Who Should Regulate Lawyers? Managing Conflict and Context in Professional
Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 466 (1996) (“The dearth of rigorous
comparative analysis limited the value of much that was written about professional
regulation.”).
7. See generally Schneyer, supra note 6 (providing a detailed account of the
various institutional influences in the process of making the Model Rules).
8. See Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 227, 243 (2014) [hereinafter Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional
Conduct] (arguing that the “one size fits all” nature of the current ethics rules regime
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confusing and often contradictory nature of ethics rules as they
currently stand.9 These difficulties are compounded by the fact that a
growing number of rulemaking institutions have independently begun
drafting their own regulations governing overlapping areas of
attorney behavior.10
One way in which drafters of ethics rules can overcome these
problems—and create more effective and efficient regulations—is by
studying potential applications of rules through a form of public
policy
analysis
called
“comparative
institutional
choice
microanalysis.”11 The purpose of such analysis is to help rule-makers
better understand how to achieve their desired public policy goals on
a case-by-case basis.12 Comparative institutional choice microanalysis
informs decision-makers’ choices through the lens of “institutional
choice theory” (ICT), which stands for the proposition that the
effectiveness of a rule is determined by particular qualities of the
institution tasked with drafting or enforcing said rule.13 According to
ICT, the ability to make informed decisions regarding which
institution to entrust with regulatory control is the key to creating
successful behavioral regulations.14
ICT is particularly useful in the area of attorney conduct
regulation, where the social interests underlying a given regulation
are both varied and complex.15 ICT suggests that, where individuals
may struggle to fully understand and act on those social interests,
made sense for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the practice of law
itself was more homogenous, but the practice is no longer homogenous, and the rules
have not adapted to this change); see also Wilkins, supra note 6, at 479 (noting that
while attorney disciplinary controls have evolved since their creation, “those original
structures and purposes continue to shape the direction of contemporary
developments”).
9. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 167 (characterizing
ethics rules as a “complex web of uncertainty”).
10. See Wilkins, supra note 6, at 467 (noting that “there are now a large number
of institutions that actively assert at least some regulatory jurisdiction over lawyers,
and an even greater number that could enter the field in the future”).
11. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,
and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1425–27 (1996)
(proposing a framework for the comparison of institutions on a context-specific
basis).
12. See id. at 1425.
13. See Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and A New Legal
Realism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 608 (2013).
14. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994).
15. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799, 860 (1992) (noting that the relationship between ethics rules’ enforcement and
the rules’ underlying social goals can be complex).
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rule-making institutions possess a wide variety of characteristics that
better qualify them to develop and apply regulations to further those
goals. Because no institution is perfect, a public policy analysis
applying ICT should consist of relative comparisons of the institutions
that could regulate a particular behavior. Further, because the
conduct governed by attorney ethics rules is so wide-ranging and
complex, the best institution to regulate one sub-field of attorney
conduct is not necessarily the best institution to regulate all such subfields. Thus, a comparison of conduct-regulating institutions should
be conducted on a case-by-case, context specific basis, labeled in this
Note as “microanalysis.”
Combining these features, “comparative institutional choice
microanalysis” is an ideal framework for helping scholars and policy
makers to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and consistency of the
rules of professional responsibility. Because this framework must be
applied independently to particular regulatory contexts, an effective
institutional choice microanalysis must revolve around a specific rule
or set of rules, as applied in a specific set of circumstances.16
Therefore, in providing an example of what a “comparative
institutional choice microanalysis” might look like, this Note selects
one particular regulatory context which has garnered significant
attention and controversy in recent years: confidentiality regulations
governing an attorney’s ability to blow the whistle on a corporate
client.
Part I of this Note outlines the theoretical foundation for ICT,
tracing its development from the “legal realism” movement of the
early twentieth century to its more modern form. It then discusses
institutional choice theory’s impact on the creation and development
of attorney conduct regulations in general, and attorneywhistleblowing regulations in particular.
It stresses that this
application has so far been rudimentary at best. Part I then
introduces a practical framework for applying ICT—comparative
institutional choice microanalysis—and discusses how this framework
can be applied to analyze the effectiveness of particular attorney
conduct regulations from a public policy perspective.
Part II of this Note lays out the basic set of facts required for a
thorough institutional choice analysis of attorney whistleblowing
regulations. First, because institutional microanalysis is so contextspecific, the relevant factual scenario must be understood in

16. See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
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significant detail.17 The social goals and interests at stake in that
context should then be analyzed.18 Based on that understanding, the
range of institutions which play some role in regulating those social
goals and interests must be determined.19 Finally, the institutional
characteristics most relevant to achieving those goals must be set out
and understood.20
Part II lays out this required background
information for a comparative institutional analysis of the
hypothetical legislature-judiciary debate presented by the
Introduction to this Note.
Part III of this Note presents the comparative institutional
microanalysis itself. To that end, Part III consists of side-by-side
comparison of three types of institutional characteristics that affect
state high courts and legislatures’ ability to create attorneywhistleblowing regulations.
First, this Part discusses the two
institutions’ expertise.
Expertise is further divided into two
categories—substantive expertise and procedural expertise.
Substantive expertise relates to the institutions’ knowledge and
understanding of particular areas of law or human behavior, and
procedural expertise relates to their relative capacities to create rules
in general. Part III of this Note then discusses the institutions’
impartiality, analyzes their institutional “accountability,” and the
public access they provide to their decision-making process.
Part III of this Note argues that, when it comes to drafting attorney
whistleblower regulations, state courts have greater substantive
expertise, but inferior procedural expertise; state courts are far less
“independent” from the target of their regulations; and state courts
are far less accountable or accessible to the public throughout the
regulation process. Based on this analysis, Part III of this Note
concludes that state legislatures would constitute the better institution
to regulate attorney whistleblowing conduct.
Significantly, this analysis assumes that all state legislatures and all
state courts share the same general characteristics; it does not take
into account differences in public institutions that may occur from
state to state. This Part notes two jurisdictions in particular—New
York and Delaware—where relevant characteristics of the courts and
legislatures vary significantly from those of other states.21 Part III

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id.
See infra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text.
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suggests additional analyses of these two jurisdictions as a useful topic
for further institutional analysis study.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
CHOICE MICROANALYSIS
A. What Is Institutional Choice Theory?

1.
a.

Theoretical Background

Institutional Choice Theory’s “Legal Realist” Roots

Modern institutional choice theory has its foundations in the legal
realism movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.22 Legal realism stands for the general proposition that the
effect of particular laws can only be fully understood in light of their
larger social context.23 For example, legal realism suggests that a
party or observer cannot accurately predict the outcome of a case
without taking into account the ideology of the judge or trends in
society at the time of a ruling.24 While judges are technically not
supposed to base judicial decisions on political beliefs or real world
experiences, legal realism argues that it is impossible for even the
most independent of judges to completely separate himself from such
extraneous concerns.
In the same vein, ICT posits that the effect of rules governing
particular social behaviors can only be fully understood in light of
characteristics of the institutions responsible for enforcing them.25
Proponents of ICT and legal realism argue that behavioral regulations
are most effective when based not on pure legal doctrine or
precedent, but on an analysis of the practical strengths and
weaknesses of the various institutional actors competing for
regulatory control over a particular social behavior.26 In other words,
22. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608.
23. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 27 (2d ed. 1990). It replaced previously-accepted concepts of
“formalism,” which treated the development of precedent and doctrine as occurring
independently of changing social values and political realities. See id.
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal
Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 106 (2009) (noting the view that “judges work in institutional settings that
shape their decision making”); see also Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating
Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1991–92 (1996).
26. Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33–34 (1996) (“A legal process scholar might argue that a
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understanding the broader social context of a policy decision is vital
in ensuring that its goals can be achieved effectively and efficiently. 27

b.

Institutional Choice Theory’s Social Science Roots

The importance of public institutions in the policy-making process
is further supported by social science studies regarding the limitations
of individuals’ decision-making capacity.28 Among the limitations
theorized by scholars is the concept of “bounded rationality,”
developed by political scientist Herbert Simon.29 The concept of
bounded rationality suggests that the rational capacity of an
individual is limited by that person’s finite capacity to obtain and
understand all the information necessary to make informed
decisions.30 Rationally “bounded” individuals increase their decisionmaking capacity by relying on institutions to “simplify and regularize
a complex environment” beyond the bounds of their own knowledge
and experience.31 This reliance better enables them to “reach
decisions in a socially coherent manner and to communicate those
decisions to other members of society.”32 In incorporating this
concept, institutional choice theory thus stands for the proposition
that members of society most effectively solve complex regulatory
problems not by directly choosing their own goals and solutions, but
by designating particular institutions to do so on their behalf.33

2.

“Goal Choice” and “Institutional Choice:” Komesar’s Two-Part
Conceptualization of Modern Institutional Choice Theory

While the concepts behind ICT can be traced back for centuries, its
treatment by scholars has seen a reinvigoration in the last several
certain institution, because of its relative ability to gather pertinent information,
should perform a regulatory task.”).
27. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“[T]he key to
good government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out
which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions
should interrelate.”).
28. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1414.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS: THE OLD
AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 81 (1994) (“Institutions provide a basis for action in
a world that would otherwise be characterized by pervasive ignorance and
uncertainty.”).
33. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1414.
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decades.34 Of particular importance to this Note’s analysis is the
comprehensive formulation of modern institutional choice theory
developed by Professor Neil Komesar.35 Komesar conceptualizes ICT
as a framework for assessing society’s pursuit of social goals through
various public institutions, each of which skews the decision-making
process in unique ways.36 Under this framework, ICT deals with both
how society chooses its goals, and how society determines which
institutions will be responsible for carrying out those goals. Komesar
labels these two related aspects of ICT as “goal choice” and
“institutional choice.”37

a.

“Goal Choice”

Goal choice analysis compares how society selects its social goals
and values, prioritizing certain goals over others to achieve a desired
outcome.38 Such social goals can include promoting economic growth,
efficiently allocating resources, protecting private property rights, and
promoting public safety.39 Depending on the particular social context,
these goals may be broad or narrow in scope;40 they might conflict
with each other, or they might complement each other.41 Public
decision-making entities are often faced with choices between such
varying goals when determining public policy.
While understanding how an institution chooses from among
society’s goals is important for evaluating public policy outcomes,

34. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1167, 1172 n.16 (2003).
35. Neil Komesar is a professor of law at University of Wisconsin School of Law.
Neil Komesar, U. WISC. L. SCH., http://law.wisc.edu/profiles/nkomesar@wi (last
visited May 15, 2015). His work on institutional choice has had a significant impact
on diverse areas of legal scholarship, including torts, property, constitutional law, and
global commerce. See Shaffer, supra note 13 at 607. While his work is only one part
of a larger reinvigoration of the institutional choice doctrine over the last several
decades, it is one of the most influential and comprehensive on the topic, especially as
applied to the study of law. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 34, at 1172 n.16.
36. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 609 (discussing Komesar’s work).
37. See id. (discussing the relationship between “goal choice” and “institutional
choice” in Komesar’s work).
38. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 4–5.
39. Id. at 5.
40. For example, a court may seek to protect the property rights of all residents of
the Hudson River Valley, or the property rights of a homeowner in a particular
residential neighborhood.
41. For example, a rule protecting one’s property rights may conflict with
another’s economic interests; on the other hand, a rule protecting the environment
may also protect individuals’ property rights.
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Komesar asserts that mere analysis of a decision-maker’s choice of
social goal is not enough to understand how effective a policy will be
in achieving that desired outcome.42 These social goals can be
achieved in many ways using a variety of social processes, and a given
regulation could be applied in conformity with any one of a broad
range of social goals.43 Thus, a decision-maker’s reasoned balancing
of social goals alone does not allow it to fully understand which rules
to apply, or how to apply them, in furtherance of those goals.44

b.

“Institutional Choice”

According to Komesar, the missing piece of this public policy
analysis is the determination of who should be responsible for
determining what an efficient outcome should look like and how it
should be achieved.45 Komesar labels the process of deciding who
decides as “institutional choice.”46 Institutional choice analysis
connects the choice of goal with the eventual public policy outcome
by determining the “best” process to use to achieve that result.47
The institutional processes responsible for achieving these public
policy goals are wide-ranging and complex.48 Komesar focuses on
three institutional processes, each of which can be broken down into
smaller components: the political process, the adjudicative process,
and the market process.49
Public institutions responsible for
overseeing the political process include city councils, state
legislatures, and Congress.50 Institutions overseeing the adjudicative
process include state courts, federal courts, and some administrative

42. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5.
43. Id. (“Upon close inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law
and public policy is generally consistent with virtually any law or public policy
outcome.”); see also Wilkins, supra note 6, at 466–67 (“[R]egulatory institutions can
pursue [their] goals through a number of interrelated tasks, ranging from drafting
rules of conduct to enforcing existing rules and imposing sanctions.”).
44. See KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5; Wilkins, supra note 6, at 466–67.
45. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5 (“A link is missing . . . in analyses that suppose
that a given law or public policy result follows from a given social goal. That missing
link is institutional choice.”).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 3 (“The alternative decision-makers are not individuals or even
small numbers of individuals. They are complex processes . . . in which the
interaction of many participants shape performance.”).
49. Id. at 9 (dividing public institutions into market, political, and adjudicative
categories).
50. See id. at 9–10 (noting that broad categories of institutions can be broken out
into their constituent parts for further institutional analysis).
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agencies.51 The market process refers generally to a reliance on
supply and demand and market transactions to achieve social goals.52
“Institutional choice” in this context refers to an actor’s decision to
select one regulatory process over another to achieve a particular
social goal.53 For example, when a judge decides a case based on the
balancing of parties’ interests, he designates a substantial regulatory
role to the court system; on the other hand, when a judge applies a
narrow rule or exception to a case, he allocates more authority to
carry out judicial directives on the markets or legislature.54 In this
context, an actor’s “institutional choice” decision is just one (albeit
the most important) aspect of ICT as a whole.55

3.

How “Goal Choice” and “Institutional Choice” Relate to
“Comparative Institutional Choice Analysis”

Because no regulating institution is perfect at its job, the goalachieving potential of a particular institution cannot be fully assessed
without comparing it to other institutions that may share some of the
same characteristics.56 Thus, no institutional choice decision is fully
informed without a side-by-side comparison of the strengths and
weaknesses of the different decision-making bodies which could
potentially have an impact on the regulatory process.57 Komesar calls
this form of inquiry “comparative institutional analysis.”58
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Daniel H. Cole, The Importance of Being Comparative M. Dale Palmer
Professorship Inaugural Lecture, 33 IND. L. REV. 921, 930 (2000) (characterizing
Komesar’s conceptualization of institutional choice).
54. Id; see also Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 106–07.
55. NEIL K. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 4–5 (noting that “analysis of goal and
value choices, standing alone, tells us ‘virtually nothing’ about these [police]
outcomes”); but c.f., Howard S. Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice
and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 988 (1997) (arguing that Komesar’s
focus on “institutional choice” at the expense of “goal choice” oversimplifies the
public-policy creation process).
56. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that institutional choice “is always a
choice among highly imperfect alternatives”).
57. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 611–12 (summarizing Komesar’s comparative
institutional choice framework).
58. Id. at 611. Since the publication of Imperfect Alternatives, comparative
institutional analysis has been applied across a wide range of disciplines, from tort
reform to internet regulation to environmental law. See Neil Komesar, The Logic of

the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the
Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265, 327–37 (2013) (collecting institutional choice
studies). “Institutional choice microanalysis,” as applied by this Note, is simply a
case-by-case application of Komesar’s broader “institutional choice analysis”
framework.
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Comparative institutional analysis is the methodological framework
by which scholars and decision-makers can apply the lessons of “goal
choice,” “institutional choice,” and ICT in general, to practical realworld situations.59
B.

1.

Institutional Choice and Attorney Behavior Regulations

The Historical Role of ICT in the Creation of Attorney Conduct
Rules

Application of ICT can be found throughout the history of the
development of attorney conduct rules—particularly within the
development of rules regarding an attorney’s duty of confidentiality
to a sophisticated corporate client.60 While ICT-based arguments
have provided significant public policy support for particular
confidentiality rules, public policy analysis of the process has often
been overshadowed by the influences of political dispute, practical
compromise, and public opinion (or lack thereof).61 The following
events in the development of confidentiality and attorneywhistleblowing provisions provide examples of institutional choice’s
visible, but sometimes limited impact.

a.

The Initial Drafting of Model Rule 1.6

In 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed
a liberal attorney-whistleblower provision based on its complaint in
SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp.,62 which argued that attorneys
practicing before the SEC could be held liable for failing to disclose
the fraudulent activities of their clients.63 However, the SEC decided
to table its proposal because the American Bar Association (ABA)
was considering the same issues in its Model Rules drafting process.64
The ABA drafting committee then sought to craft an attorneywhistleblower provision that would “be tough enough to convince the
SEC to back off, yet hedged enough to keep lawyers’ relations with

59. Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and A New Legal
Realism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2013) (characterizing comparative
institutional analysis as critical in applying institutional choice theory to inform “reallife decision making”)
60. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 679.
61. See generally id.
62. 457 F. Supp. 682, 704 (D.D.C. 1978).
63. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 705–06.
64. See id. at 706.
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managers comfortable.”65 From an institutional choice perspective,
the SEC’s decision to table its own proposal implied a belief that the
ABA, not the SEC, was the proper institution for the regulationdrafting role at that time.66
In 1983, the American Bar Association revised an earlier version of
its primary confidentiality rule, Model Rule 1.6, to allow for
disclosure of client confidences to prevent a crime resulting in death
or serious injury, but not to prevent or mitigate the effects of financial
or property-related crimes.67
Believing that the ABA’s final
formulation of Model Rule 1.6 created a haven for white-collar
criminals, United States Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill in
the Senate that would make the prior version of Model Rule 1.6
(allowing for disclosure of client confidences to prevent financial
crimes, not just death or bodily harm) into federal criminal law.68
In response, “even the bar leaders who had opposed the
amendment to Rule 1.6 in the ABA House of Delegates opposed the
Specter bill, arguing that lawyers are and should be regulated at the
state level and by courts, not legislatures.”69 The bar leaders believed
that “Congress, as a matter of policy, should leave even this nonlitigation aspect of law practice to the governance of the state
supreme courts, which could be expected to show more deference
than Congress to the ABA rule.”70 The Specter amendment was
withdrawn, and states were able to rely on the ABA’s formulation of
Model Rule 1.6 in enacting their own binding confidentiality
regulations.71 Here, Congress’ deferral to the ABA’s rule-drafters
(and by implication, state courts) acted as an implicit acceptance of
the ABA’s leading role in the matter of drafting confidentiality rules
for the legal profession. This ICT-based argument in opposition to
the Specter amendment clearly played an important role in the
ABA’s maintenance of rulemaking authority over attorney-client
confidentiality.72

65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 713.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Ted Schneyer, supra note 15, at 43.
71. See id.
72. See id. (noting that “assumptions about the relative competence of the ABA
and other standard setters play a vital role in ABA rulemaking”).
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The Promulgation of SEC Rule 205.3

The SEC and ABA rule-drafters again found themselves at odds in
2002 over the SEC’s promulgation of SEC Rule 205.3 and its
proposed “noisy withdrawal” provision.73 In the wake of the Enron
and Worldcom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which mandated in part that the SEC create new attorney
confidentiality rules allowing corporate attorneys more leeway in
reporting clients’ financial frauds.74 Pursuant to this delegation of
authority, the SEC enacted Rule 205.3(d), which allows attorneys to
reveal the confidential information of their clients to prevent or
mitigate financial fraud in some circumstances.75 Additionally, the
SEC proposed a “noisy withdrawal” provision, which would have
required corporate attorneys to withdraw from representation of a
client, and announce the withdrawal to the SEC, upon discovery of
client fraud in certain circumstances.76
At the time, the primary ABA Model Rule addressing this conduct
(Rule 1.6(b)), allowed attorneys to disclose client confidences to
prevent crimes likely to result in death or serious bodily injury, but
not crimes resulting in purely financial injury.77 In fact, the ABA had
recently rejected an amendment of its own that proposed expansion
of the confidentiality exception to allow for the reporting of client
fraud.78 As a result of the outcry connected to the Enron and
Worldcom collapse, the ABA agreed to reconsider its position on
lawyers’ responsibility to report, or “blow the whistle,” on clients’
fraud.79
In a compromise between the SEC and the organized bar, the SEC
tabled its “noisy withdrawal” rules pending further consideration.80
The SEC limited its finalized regulation, SEC Rule 205.3, to allow for

73. See Clifton Barnes, ABA, States, and SEC Hash Out Lawyers’ Responsibility
In Corporate Settings, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/
2003_04/2802/corporate.html (last visited May 15, 2015).
74. Id.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014); see also Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits,

Lawyers As Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical
Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J.
10, 14 (2012).
76. See Barnes, supra note 73.
77. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 80–81 (ed. 2007).
78. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 212–13 (3d ed. 2012).
79. See id.
80. Id.
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the reporting of client frauds using confidential information under
certain circumstances, but it did not mandate the reporting or “noisy
withdrawal.” 81 The ABA, in turn, amended its Model Rule 1.6(b) to
correspondingly broaden its exceptions to confidentiality rules by
allowing attorneys to report client financial frauds using otherwise
confidential client information (rather than only to report crimes
resulting in death or serious bodily harm).82

c.

The Second Circuit Decision in United States v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc.

The 2013 Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc.83 provides a more recent example of how the choice
of regulatory institution can affect the creation and application of
confidentiality rules.84 The plaintiffs in Quest brought a federal False
Claims Act (FCA) suit against defendant Quest Diagnostics, claiming
that the medical diagnostics laboratory engaged in illegal kickbacks
by underpricing some of its services in order to obtain other federally
funded business.85 The principal plaintiff, Mark Bibi, based his
kickback allegations in part on confidential information he had
obtained from the defendant through his years of service as the
defendant’s in-house counsel.86 Bibi first argued that the broad
disclosure of his former client’s confidential information was
permitted under New York’s Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2)
(NY RPC 1.6(b)(2)), which permits an attorney to “reveal or use
confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a
crime . . .”87 However, the court made it clear that Bibi’s disclosures

81. Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270 (2003) (noting the ABA’s active campaign
against the “noisy withdrawal” provision).
82. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 78, at 212–13. It is important to note that,
despite the ABA’s broadening of the whistleblowing exceptions to Model Rule 1.6,
application of the exceptions is still limited to situations where the attorney’s services
were used in furtherance of the fraud. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2014).
83. See generally 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013).
84. As will be shown, the Quest opinion represents an appellate panel’s choice to
entrust regulation of a particular type of attorney behavior to a state judiciary rather
than the federal Congress. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text; see also
Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 107 n.205 (noting that judges make “institutional
choices” when determining which rule to apply in a given situation).
85. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 159–161.
86. Id. at 159–62.
87. See id. at 164; N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(2) (2014).
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went far beyond what would have been “reasonably necessary” under
NY RPC 16.(b)(2), and thus would have constituted a violation of the
ethics rule, if it were to apply here.88
To the extent that his wide-ranging disclosures went beyond what
was permitted under NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) as “reasonably necessary”
under the circumstances, Bibi argued that NY RPC 1.6(b)(2)’s
“reasonable necessity” limitation should not apply.89 This is because,
he argued, NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) is preempted by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)
of the federal False Claims Act.90 Rather than limiting potential
disclosures to those which are necessary to prevent or disclose fraud,
§ 3730(b)(2) requires a potential False Claims Act plaintiff to make
disclosure of “substantially all material evidence and information the
person possesses” as a prerequisite to a successful FCA claim.91 Bibi
argued that the application of FCA’s “substantially all material
evidence” standard would allow for the disclosure of a far broader
range of confidential information than would be permitted under the
New York conduct rules.92 In asking the court to apply the FCA
standard, Bibi believed he should be allowed to move forward with
his FCA complaint based on his broad disclosure of confidential
client information.93 Bibi’s argument effectively forced the court to
decide whether to apply NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) and its restrictive
“reasonable necessity” standard, or the FCA and its broader
“substantially all material evidence” standard to Bibi’s disclosures.94
In determining which rule to apply, the Second Circuit
acknowledged what Komesar would call a “goal choice” problem.95
The court noted that “the central purpose of the N.Y. Rules—to
protect client confidences—can be inconsistent with or antithetical to
federal interests, which under the FCA, are to encourage private
individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the

88. See Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 165.
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id. Preemption creates additional questions of its own, which are beyond the
scope of this Note. This Note assumes away any constitutional issues with
preemption, and analyzes the state-vs.-federal law issue solely from a public policy
perspective.
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
92. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164–65.
93. Id. at 165.
94. Id. at 164–65.
95. Komesar recognized a goal choice problem under similar circumstances—
where a court was forced to decide between two rules supporting two different social
goals. See KOMESAR supra note 14, at 14–28 (analyzing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Company, 26 N.Y.2d 219(1970)).
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government to bring such information forward.”96 The plaintiff asked
the court to prioritize the goal of encouraging whistleblowers to come
forward in cases like this by applying the FCA’s “substantially all
material evidence” standard, while the defendants asked the court to
prioritize the goal of protecting stronger lawyer-client confidentiality
by applying the more narrow “reasonable necessity” standard.97
However, the court did not to enter into a detailed “goal choice”
analysis of these competing social interests, nor did it provide its own
view regarding which underlying goal should be prioritized in this
situation.98 Rather, the court merely stated that the New York ethics
rule’s “reasonable necessity” standard “implicitly accounts for the
federal interests at stake in the FCA,” so it “need not give way to
section 3730(b)(2)’s requirement of full disclosure of material
evidence.”99 Thus, the Second Circuit resolved the problem in Quest
with what Komesar would call an “institutional choice” decision.100
The court’s deferral to NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) regarding the proper
balance of state and federal interests suggests a belief on the part of
the panel that the institution responsible for the drafting of NY RPC
1.6 (the New York state court system) was more competent than
Congress, or the panel itself, to regulate lawyers’ behavior in the
particular context discussed in Quest.101
However, the Quest court’s institutional choice analysis appears
superficial at best, including only cursory policy analysis in support of
its decision.102 For the Quest court to maximize the public policy
benefits of its decision regarding “which rule to apply” to Bibi’s
behavior situation, ICT would suggest that the court would first need
a more rigorous analysis of “which institution should govern”
96. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 163 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
97. See id. at 164.
98. C.f. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 16–17 (noting the Boomer majority and
minority’s “goal choice” disagreement).
99. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164. The court thus chose to apply NY
RPC 1.6(b)(2), and held that Bibi’s disclosures violated the rule by being broader
than reasonably necessary to prevent the defendant’s alleged fraud. The case was
dismissed, and the plaintiffs were barred from bringing any future cases based on
Bibi’s disclosures. Id. at 165.
100. C.f. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 23–24 (noting that the Boomer majority and
minority’s “goal choice” disagreement was solved by an “institutional choice”
decision).
101. C.f. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 33-34 (presenting the argument that particular
institutions should perform certain tasks based on their relative strengths and
weaknesses).
102. See Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164 (noting that New York Rule of
Conduct 1.6 “implicitly accounts for the federal interests at stake”).
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behavior like Bibi’s in the first place. Thus, from a public policy
perspective, the result would be enhanced by a comparative
institutional choice discussion analyzing the following question: What
are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the New York state court
system, the federal courts, and congress, in weighing the importance
of protecting client confidences against the importance of
encouraging anti-fraud whistleblowing?

2.

Attorney Conduct Rulemaking Process’s Need for More
Rigorous Institutional Choice Analysis

a.

Lack of Rigorous Public Policy Analysis and the Rules’
Relevance in a Growing and Evolving Legal Industry

The legal industry has seen substantial change over time. For
example, while legal practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries revolved around litigation, the vast majority of lawyers
today rarely see the inside of a courtroom.103 Additionally, the unified
nature of the legal industry has long since given way to diversification
and specialization of individual practice areas.104 Scholars have noted
a drastic shift in the economics of legal practice: where lawyers once
possessed specialized legal knowledge unique to members of the bar,
many sophisticated corporate clients now have their own law
departments and in-house counsel providing them with competing
sources of legal advice.105
However, ethics rules governing the practice of law have failed to
keep pace with these structural changes in the legal industry.106
Scholars argue that, as a result, many aspects of the current ethics

103. Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 153 (quoting
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—the Role of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 5 (1989–1990)); see also Terry
Carter, The Endangered Trial Lawyer, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Mar. 2, 2009, 04:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_endangered_trial_lawyer (noting a
decrease in both the number of trials and seasoned trial attorneys in recent years).
104. See Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 244
(noting that “as the practice of law grows increasingly specialized, even lawyers in the
same practice area may have uniquely distinguishable practices”). The practice of
personal injury law, for example, now bears little in common with the practice of
securities law before the SEC. Similarly, the practice of a modern-day solo
practitioner has little in common with the practice of a corporate transactional
attorney. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 817.
105. Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in
Justifying Some Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 49, 93–94 (2001).
106. See Wilkins, supra note 6, at 479.
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rulemaking regime are based on outdated assumptions of the past,
rather than characteristics of the modern legal industry.107 For
example, some scholars criticize the “one-size-fits-all” nature of
modern ethics rules, which are intended to apply to every facet of
legal practice despite vast differences between specific legal
disciplines.108 To combat such anachronisms in the ethics rulemaking
process and develop more relevant and effective rules, decisionmakers should pay closer attention to the public policy and
institutional choice implications of ethics rules throughout the
drafting and application process.109

b.

Lack of Public Policy Analysis in the Confusing and
Contradictory Nature of Ethics Rules

The lack of public policy analysis in the drafting of modern ethics
rules, combined with the continued maintenance of the “one-size-fitsall” ethics regime, has also played a role in the overwhelming
complexity of the current rulemaking regime.110 Ethics rules purport
to cover a vast range of attorney behaviors and ethical situations.
However, state high courts responsible for adopting the rules are
rarely clear about the practical effect those rules should have on
lower courts or disciplinary committees when ruling on specific
instances of attorney conduct.111 Some courts have been hesitant to
apply sanctions or hold attorneys liable for their conduct even after
conclusively determining that they had violated a particular rule of
professional conduct.112 Conversely, others have applied a broad
range of sanctions for violations of conduct rules.113 While ethics rule107. Id. (noting that, while ethics rules have changed over time, the older and more
traditional structure of the industry “continue[s] to shape the direction of
contemporary developments” in ethics regulation).
108. See, e.g., Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First
Century, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2007) (noting that with the vast traditional,
ethical, and moral differences within the modern legal profession, “agreeing to a
single uniform definition of professionalism becomes impossible”); Wald, Resizing
the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 228 (noting that critics have long
called for “the promulgation of rules of conduct more in tune with and sensitive to
the increasingly diverse realities practicing lawyers face”).
109. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 153–54 (noting that
“the evolution and growth of law practice demands close scrutiny of judicial
regulation of lawyers”).
110. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 167 (labeling
attorney ethics rules as a “complex web of uncertainty”).
111. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that state courts often take
contradictory approaches when applying ethics rules in particular cases)
112. See id.
113. See id. at 83.
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makers may have legitimate reasons for providing such a wide variety
of standards for attorney conduct, the practice can tend to lead to
confusing and inconsistent results.114
Problems with the ethics rules’ effectiveness, consistency, and
relevance are further exacerbated by the presence of a growing
number of institutional actors who have assumed some role in
attorney conduct regulation.115 For example, in 2002 Congress
enacted § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which gave the SEC 180
days to promulgate rules “establishing minimum standards of conduct
for attorneys representing public companies before the SEC.”116
Pursuant to § 307, the SEC promulgated its own rule, § 205.3, which
allows attorneys to report the past financial fraud of corporate clients
in certain circumstances.117
This complexity creates a daunting barrier to the effective
application of institutional choice analysis to the field of attorney
conduct regulation.
At the same time, the confusing and
unpredictable nature of the current regime of attorney conduct rules
is a main reason that an institutional analysis of the field is so
important. In describing how best to create or apply an attorney
conduct rule to achieve a desired result, institutional choice can help
designers of the rules create a more coherent regime of conduct
regulation, and help regulators themselves apply the rules more
consistently and with greater effect.118
C.

Institutional Choice Analysis and Attorney Whistleblowing
Regulations

1.

Institutional Choice Analysis on Attorney Whistleblower
Regulations, and Need for More Rigorous Analysis

Choices between competing regulatory institutions have prominent
roles in both the creation and application of attorney-client
confidentiality rules over the last thirty years. While institutional

114. See id at 136.
115. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 803 (discussing the rise in alternative systems of
lawyer regulation and regulatory enforcement).
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the

Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers
Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 875 (2003).
117. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014).
118. See Dzienkowski, supra note 111, at 85 (noting that “it is desirable for society
to regulate lawyers under a code of ethics that guides lawyers to make consistent
decisions when confronted with the same ethical issues; thus, consistency is an
important objective of ethics rule design”).
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choice decisions have helped the ABA, SEC, Congress, and federal
courts further their chosen social goals, these examples also suggest
that the policy analysis behind such decisions has been far from
rigorous. Institutional choice decisions like the ones discussed supra
have been driven as much by political realities, self-interest, and
public opinion, as they have by reasoned public policy analysis.119
Given this need for more thorough public-policy analysis by the
relevant institutional decision-makers, and the obvious historical
importance of institutional choice theory, it is surprising to find that
the body of scholarship actually comparing the relative competence of
attorney-conduct-rule-drafting institutions is sparse.120
Professor David Wilkins published what is considered by many to
be the pioneering study of institutional choice in the legal ethics
context.121 In his 1992 Harvard Law Review article, Wilkins argued
that scandals like the Lincoln Savings and Loan crisis,122 in which
lawyer malfeasance was implicated, combined with the significant
growth and change of the American legal industry, created a need to
rethink the efficacy of the current lawyer-controlled system of
attorney conduct regulation.123 Wilkins divided the field of attorney
conduct regulation into two distinct sub-categories—rule creation and
rule enforcement—focusing his attention on a public policy analysis
of the “rule enforcement” category.124 He then proceeded to provide
a framework for what such a public policy review might look like,
further dividing rule enforcement into smaller categories and
comparing characteristics of the different institutions which could be
responsible for regulation of each aspect of attorney conduct.125
Professor Benjamin Barton took up the task of conducting a
comparative institutional analysis of rule creation, the second of
Wilkins’ two sub-categories.126 Barton’s study took a top-down

119. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 677.
120. Barton, supra note 34, at 1173–74 (“The few commentators who have
addressed this question have approached it as a matter of doctrine, i.e., whether the
“inherent authority” claimed by state supreme courts is a proper reading of state
constitutional law, or have treated the topic glancingly.”).
121. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 34; Wilkins, supra note 15.
122. The Lincoln Savings and Loan crisis involved the rapid collapse of a large
bank due to widespread financial fraud. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 868 n.302.
123. See id. at 802–03.
124. Id. at 803–04.
125. Id. Because this Note focuses on the other sub-category of attorney conduct
regulation—rule creation—the precise details of Wilkins’ framework are not directly
relevant to this study.
126. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1167. Benjamin Barton is a professor of law at
University of Tennessee College of Law. Benjamin Barton, U. TENN. KNOXVILLE,
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approach to attorney behavior regulation, analyzing the relative
strengths and weaknesses of several institutions which could be
responsible for such rule creation as a whole.127 He compared the
institutions along three interrelated goals of attorney conduct
regulation: limiting the potential for rent-seeking, maximizing
procedural efficiency, and democratization.128 In conclusion, Barton
found that “although each institution has substantial weaknesses that
likely will result in lawyer dominance of the regulatory process, a
legislative body—either Congress or state legislatures—would be
more likely to produce public-minded regulation and limit lawyer
rent-seeking.”129

2.

Framework of Comparative Institutional Choice Microanalysis in
Future Institutional Analysis

As the number of parties involved in the dispute and the
complexity of their interaction grows, a court’s institutional choice
becomes more and more complicated.130 More parties means higher
transaction costs and less predictable outcomes, which detracts from
the ability of courts to craft efficient regulations over the social
behavior in question.131 The increasing breadth and complexity of the
regulated behavior also makes scholars’ institutional choice analysis
in those areas more complex.132
Comparative institutional choice analysis thus becomes more
challenging to apply to specific factual scenarios as the relevant social
issues and institutions grow in complexity.133 This difficulty highlights
the limitations of Komesar’s and Wilkins’ analyses, which the scholars
have acknowledged.134 Their broad frameworks were not intended to

http://law.utk.edu/people/benjamin-barton/ (last visited May 15, 2015). His work on
public policy and the legal industry is widely cited by scholars in many related
disciplines.
127. Barton, supra note 34, at 1171 (“Given the existence of a regulatory problem,
this Article assesses lawyer regulation from the top down.”).
128. See id. at 1177.
129. See id. at 1175.
130. See KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 22.
131. Id.
132. See id.; Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (“[T]he conceptual complexity of
drawing upon several disciplines may become unmanageable unless the range of
discourse remains limited.”).
133. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608 (“Komesar’s analytic framework necessarily
calls for close empirical understanding and microanalysis of institutional processes in
particular contexts.”).
134. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, The Perils of Pandora: Further Reflections on
Institutional Choice, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1003 (1997) (“[I]t would be
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be applied directly to any given policy decision, but rather were
provided as overviews of institutional choice concepts to be further
developed and applied to particular situations by future public policy
analyses.135
Some scholars have argued that meeting the challenge of realworld application requires narrowing the scope of a comparative
institutional analysis to very limited, fact-specific contexts.136
Professor Edward Rubin,137 who terms this context-specific
application “institutional microanalysis,” suggests that such narrow
application is necessary in applying institutional choice analysis to
specific regulatory fields such as attorney conduct regulation.138 This
is in part because attorney conduct regulations have different results
when applied to different factual situations; broad analyses
purporting to cover such wide-ranging regulations would be far less
effective at predicting a particular regulatory outcome.139 For these
reasons, this Note adopts Professor Rubin’s “microanalysis”
framework in applying Komesar’s, Wilkins’, and Barton’s broader
institutional analyses to the specific area of attorney-whistleblowing
regulations.140

impossible for me to set out and examine the virtually infinite number of public
policy settings and problems that might be amenable to this analysis. I did not intend
the book to be an encyclopedia of institutional choice; I was only writing the preface
to that encyclopedia and trying to convince others to contribute various volumes and
sections.”).
135. Id.; see also Schneyer, supra note 15, at 34 (“[R]egulatory institutions now
vary so much in structure and operation that if policy makers are to assign tasks
wisely, they often need more finely grained comparisons than broad categories
allow.”).
136. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (“[T]he conceptual complexity of drawing upon
several disciplines may become unmanageable unless the range of discourse remains
limited.”); see also Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608.
137. Edward Rubin is a professor of law and political science at Vanderbilt
University
Law
School.
Edward
L.
Rubin,
VAND.
L.
SCH.,
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/edward-rubin (last visited May 15, 2015). His work
applying economics and social science concepts to legal and institutional analysis is
widely cited and discussed by scholars of legal analysis.
138. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (noting that context-specificity is important in
institutional choice because “law involves aspects of social institutions that operate at
the particularized level”)
139. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1152 (1993) (criticizing the “broadly stated
principles” declared by previous iterations of attorney conduct regulations).
140. Wilkins, supra note 6, at 492 (concluding that “the study of the legal
profession, therefore, must center around the microanalysis of institutions”) (internal
quotations and ellipses omitted).
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II. CONDUCTING A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
MICROANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY-WHISTLEBLOWING
REGULATIONS: WHAT DATA DO WE NEED?
As discussed supra Part I, some preliminary information is
required before a thorough comparative institutional analysis can be
conducted. First, because institutional microanalysis is so contextspecific, the relevant factual scenario must be understood in
significant detail.141 The social goals and interests at stake in that
context must then be analyzed.142 Based on that understanding, the
range of institutions which play some role in regulating those social
goals and interests must be determined.143
And finally, the
institutional characteristics most relevant to achieving those goals
must be set out and understood.144 This Part lays out this required
background information for a comparative institutional analysis of
the hypothetical legislature-judiciary debate presented by the
Introduction to this Note.
A. The Regulatory Context to Which this Note’s Microanalysis
Will Be Applied
The hypothetical situation presented in the Introduction to this
Note establishes a situation in which a state’s legislature seeks to
enact a regulation determining the circumstances under which an
attorney must disclose otherwise confidential client information in
order to prevent or remedy a client’s fraud.145 The state judiciary, on
the other hand, has already enacted a similar rule that does not
“require” reporting of such confidences, but only “permits” it under
certain circumstances.146
The context of this Note’s “microanalysis” is relatively narrow in
that it deals only with the specific sub-field of attorney conduct
regulation relating to confidentiality and whistleblowing
regulations.147 However, it is very broad in that the analysis assumes

141. See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
146. While such conflict would inevitably raise additional practical and
constitutional difficulties, this hypothetical assumes those issues away for the sake of
focusing on the public policy concerns at stake.
147. There are many levels of specificity at which this “microanalysis” could be
conducted. For example, one could chose to analyze a) institutions’ capacity to
regulate attorney conduct in general; b) institutions’ capacity to regulate attorney
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that state institutions share common characteristics across all
jurisdictions, and is thus meant to apply generally across all U.S.
jurisdictions. Thus, where the practice of law and the makeup of
governing institutions are shared by individual states, the lessons of
this analysis can be generalized across those jurisdictions.148
B.

The Social Goals Implicated by Attorney-Whistleblowing
Regulation

1.

A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty of Confidentiality

Current regulations governing attorney-whistleblowing revolve
primarily around the doctrine of attorneys’ ethical duty to maintain
client confidences.149 The centrality of this ethical duty within the
practice of law is discussed in Comment 2 of the American Bar
Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, which calls a
lawyer’s duty to protect client confidentiality “a fundamental
principle in the client-lawyer relationship.”150 The ABA broadly
defines the scope of confidential information as “all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”151

conduct relating specifically to types of behavior like whistleblowing; or c)
institutions’ capacity to regulate an attorney’s ability to blow the whistle on a past
client where that client was also his employer (e.g., the lawyer was in-house counsel).
This Note’s analysis applies a “middle-level” of specificity to avoid challenges that
would arise from either over-specificity or over-generalization: if the analysis is too
general, its results could not practically be applied to any particular context; if the
analysis is too narrow, then its results would vary drastically case-by-case, leading to
conflicting and inefficient results. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 515–17 (1990).
148. Significantly, in the context of creating attorney-whistleblower regulations,
several states’ institutions do differ materially from others—they may thus merit their
own independent analyses. These states, including New York and Delaware, are
dealt with in more detail in Part III.
149. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014); NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2003); see also Daniel R.
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (arguing that
“confidentiality is the bedrock principle of legal ethics”).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003). While the lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality is often conflated with the related doctrine of attorney-client
privilege, this definition makes it clear that the doctrine of confidentiality is far
broader in scope than attorney-client privilege. For example, the ethical duty of
confidentiality covers “information gained during the course of representation, while
the privilege protects only specific “communications between a lawyer and client.”
See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 28–29 (6th ed. 2002). Thus,
“much information that is ethically protected [by the confidentiality doctrine] will not
be privileged because the source of the information was not the client or its agents.”
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003).
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Proponents of strict confidentiality rules argue that such
protections are vital to the proper functioning of American legal
practice.152 This is, they assert, in part because advice from lawyers is
essential in ensuring that individuals are able to act in accordance
with the complex laws and regulations that they might not otherwise
appreciate or understand.153 Many lawyers argue that this advice is
only accurate and effective if clients are able to share the potentially
damaging details of their legal situations in confidence.154 In such
situations (argues the ABA), “lawyers know that almost all clients
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.”155
The most influential formulation of the rule governing an
attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality is the ABA’s Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6.156 Model Rule 1.6 generally requires
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of client information learned
during the course of the lawyer’s representation.157 The full extent of
confidentiality protections provided by this rule is made clear by the
scope of its exceptions. Model Rule 1.6(b), for example, provides
seven such exceptions that potentially limit an attorney’s
confidentiality obligations and allow him to disclose the confidential
information of a client or former client.158 Most relevant to this Note
are 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3), which were added to Model Rule 1.6 in
2003 in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals.159
Rule 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) deal with a lawyer’s ability to disclose
client confidences to prevent a client’s future financial crime, or
rectify one that has already taken place. The relevant portions of
these provisions read as follows:

152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003).
153. See Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to
Law: A Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 135, 151 (2013)
(“Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their
rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and
correct.”) (quoting the Comment to Model Rule 1.6 of the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2003).
155. Id.
156. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 810; see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014). Even though the Model Rules do not have the force of law
in any jurisdiction, many states have enacted the language of Model Rule 1.6 into law
as is; others adopted it with minor changes. Wilkins, supra note 15, at 810.
157. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16 (“The ABA Model Rules require
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of information learned by the lawyer in the
course of the representation.”).
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014).
159. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16; see also supra Part I.B.1.b.
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(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
....
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of
a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer’s services . . . 160

The permissive language of Rule 1.6 (“a lawyer may reveal . . . ”)
provides an attorney with discretion to make her own determination
whether to report client confidences and provides the circumstances
under which she may do so.161 The rule limits permissible disclosures
to those “the lawyer reasonably believes necessary” under the
circumstances, which ostensibly provides some guidance as to how
much information an attorney may disclose.162
Many jurisdictions base the language of their confidentiality rules
on the ABA rule’s formulation.163 For example, New York Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 is the primary rule regulating an attorney’s
duty of confidentiality while practicing law in the state of New
York.164 NY RPC 1.6 maintains the permissive language of the Model
Rule, but allows for a reporting of client confidences under broader,
and less-well-defined circumstances.165
The relevant portion of the law reads as follows:
(b) A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the
extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
....
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime.166

NY RPC 1.6 is thus both broader and narrower than the ABA
Model Rule.167 Primarily, the New York rule provides for the

160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014).
161. See id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (discussing the process by which
states formulate their rules of professional conduct).
164. Unlike the ABA Model Rule, which courts look to only as persuasive
authority, NY RPC 1.6 has been enacted as law and is thus authoritative in the state.
165. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16.
166. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014).
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reporting of otherwise confidential information to “prevent the client
from committing a crime,” with no requirement that the lawyer’s
assistance be used in furtherance, like in the equivalent ABA rule.168
However, NY RPC 1.6 only allows for disclosure of confidences to
prevent a future crime, and provides no exception to allow for the
mitigation or rectification of past crimes.169
In contrast to the broad discretion provided to attorneys in
deciding whether to report client confidences under NY RPC 1.6(b),
New Jersey’s relevant confidentiality rule affirmatively requires
attorneys to report client confidences in certain situations. The
relevant provision reads:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such [confidential] information to the
proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client or another
person:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another . . . .170

Like the New York rule, New Jersey’s Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6 provides an exception to its confidentiality rule only to
prevent future crimes, not to mitigate or rectify past crimes.171
However, its mandatory language also removes all discretion from the
attorney in deciding whether or not to make use of this exception in
reporting confidences in the face of client fraud.172
Another important rule defining an attorney’s ethical duty of
confidentiality is ABA Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.13,
succinctly titled “Organization as Client.”173 Model Rule 1.13
addresses what measures an attorney may take when they discover
potentially harmful misconduct occurring within a client
organization.174
It states that, when a lawyer discovers such
misconduct in the client organization, the lawyer should first report

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16.
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014).
See id.
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014).

See id.
Id.; Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 17.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014).
See Nicole Kroetsch & Samantha Petrich, Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility: Should the American Bar Association Adopt New Ethics Rules?, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 727, 733 (2003).
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such wrongdoing up to the client’s top management.175 If, however,
top management fails to act in a timely or appropriate manner to
address the issue, and the lawyer reasonably believes that the
wrongdoing will result in injury to the client organization, then “the
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether
or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury
to the organization.”176
Rule 1.13 thus provides an additional, if limited, exception to the
Model Rules’ confidentiality requirements.177 It permits an attorney
to disclose confidential information by “reporting out,” to regulators
or courts, but only after meeting Rule 1.13’s “reporting up”
requirements by bringing his concerns to the client’s top
management.178 As can be seen from such examples of confidentiality
regulations, states and bar associations have numerous rules
governing the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality. However, the
breadth of such rules is limited by the rules’ exceptions allowing
lawyers to blow the whistle on their clients using that very same
confidential information.

2.

Protection of Investors and the Public’s Economic Well-Being

In order to conduct a fully informed institutional choice analysis of
attorney-whistleblower regulations, one should also understand
society’s interest in allowing for greater transparency and disclosure
of client confidences that may be harmful to society as a whole. To
that effect, attorney whistleblowing regulations also implicate a
significant public interest in preventing financial frauds perpetrated
against public companies and government institutions.179 Many
whistleblowing provisions cite this public policy justification in
encouraging individuals to blow the whistle on clients, employers,
customers, or others who commit financial wrongdoing.180 However,

175. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014).
176. Id.
177. Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional
Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 387 (2013).
178. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014).
179. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 6 (2005) (noting that whistleblower laws are
necessary for fraud prevention).
180. As one commentator states, “a whistleblower is defined as someone who,
believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves,
publicly ‘blows the whistle’ if the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal,
fraudulent, or harmful activity.” Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should

Legislatures and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector
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because fraud comes in many forms and has different effects when
perpetrated in different economic contexts, the strength of, and need
for, anti-fraud whistleblowing regulations varies from context to
context.181
Two of the most significant areas of anti-fraud
whistleblowing legislation in recent years relate to fraud against
government spending programs,182 and fraud against the investing
public.183
The qui tam provision of the FCA is the primary whistleblowing
provision related to the prevention of fraud against the federal
government.184 The FCA provides a private right of action for
individuals, known as relators, to file suit on behalf of the government
against anyone who brings a false claim for payment to the federal
government.185 The FCA further provides up to thirty percent of the
potential judgment to the relator as a reward for whistleblowing
against the fraudsters and prosecuting their fraud.186 To justify these
rewards, Congress cited the growth of “sophisticated and widespread
fraud” against the federal government, stating that “only a
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will
decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.”187
As one
commentator notes,
Qui tam’s champions point to its rapid growth and spectacular
results—some seven thousand cases since 1986 with judgments now

Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316
(1993) (quoting WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181. Senate reports supporting the passage of these provisions provide some
insight into specific policy justifications. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010)
(discussing the policy need for a strong securities fraud whistleblower program); S.
REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (discussing the need for stronger whistleblower incentives
under the False Claims Act).
182. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 6 (discussing the magnitude of recent frauds against
the federal government, and the importance of the False Claims Act in combating
this fraud).
183. See generally S. REP. NO. 111-176 (discussing recent securities fraud such as
the Madoff scandal, and the need for strong whistleblower protections to combat
such frauds).
184. James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand: The
False Claims Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care—A Legal and Economic
Perspective, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 113, 131 (2007) (characterizing the False
Claims Act as one of the most important tools for fighting healthcare fraud).
185. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012); Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam
Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949,
952 (2007).
186. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
187. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2.
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approaching three billion dollars annually, easily rivaling and even
eclipsing securities and antitrust litigation—as evidence of massive
corporate fraud committed against the United States and, in turn,
the need for a robust private enforcement role.188

Thus, the success of the FCA’s whistleblower regime in uncovering
fraud against the government presents at least some argument in
favor of strong anti-fraud whistleblower incentives and protections in
this context.
The primary whistleblower provision regarding fraud against the
investing public was established by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (DoddFrank).189 Dodd-Frank created Section 21F of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which created a whistleblower bounty
program under which individuals are encouraged to bring information
about securities fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission.190
Under section 21F, if this information leads to a successful SEC
enforcement action in which more than $1 million is recovered, the
whistleblower is entitled to ten to thirty percent of that recovery as
reward.191
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program was created in direct
response to the financial crisis of 2008–2009 that nearly crippled the
U.S. economy.192 It was intended by Congress to “motivate those with
inside knowledge to come forward and assist the Government to
identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws,”
where federal agencies may have failed during the crisis.193 In
support, Congress noted that “whistleblower tips were 13 times more
effective than external audits.”194 Thus, whistleblowing by private
parties was seen as an important tool in society’s fight against growing
securities and financial fraud.195

188. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General:
Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1246–47 (2012)
(internal citations omitted).
189. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F (2014); Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 10–11.
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F.
191. Id.
192. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. It is important to note that SEC Rule 205.3, as discussed above, theoretically
works in conjunction with Section 21F to allow lawyers to participate in the DoddFrank whistleblower program by loosening confidentiality protections, which might
have otherwise precluded their participation as whistleblowers in certain
circumstances.
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The Relationship Between Society’s Interest in Confidentiality
Protections and Its Interest in Investor Protections

Some commentators suggest that maintaining robust protections
over the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality, and minimizing
attorney-whistleblowing opportunity, is the best policy to prevent
corporate financial fraud.196 These commentators argue that “for a
lawyer to develop the level of trust necessary to provide effective
advice, the client must first trust that his “innermost secrets are
protected by the lawyer’s pledge of silence.”197 The trust that comes
from strict attorney confidentiality requirements will encourage more
admissions of fraudulent behavior on the part of large corporate
clients, where clients would otherwise have hidden wrongdoing even
from their own outside representatives.198 These open and honest
attorney-client communications, protected by strict confidentiality
rules, will then allow lawyers to more effectively advise corporate
clients against further abuse, shaping corporations into law-abiding
entities.199 Any anti-fraud legislation creating greater opportunity for
attorneys to blow the whistle on their clients, therefore, would
backfire and make fraud even harder to detect and prevent.200 This
perspective suggests that confidentiality is a valuable tool for public
investor protection and a necessary part of a government’s anti-fraud
regulations.201
However, other scholars and many members of the public do not
believe that corporate lawyers play the role of the client’s conscience
in discouraging fraud to the same extent believed by many attorneys
themselves.202
Many believed that attorneys were actually

196. See, e.g., Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (“Independence from the client, however, is generally
not a legitimate aspiration for the bar because individuals and organizations need
lawyers to owe them a duty of loyalty in whom they can confide with confidence.”);
Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (2003).
197. Fox, supra note 196, at 1246.
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 73 (discussing the perspective that “when clients
fear their secrets are unsafe, they may not seek or obtain the legal advice that heads
off behavior that harms the public”).
200. Fox, supra note 196, at 1247.
201. Spaulding, supra note 153, at 162 (noting that confidentiality protections “may
give the lawyer unique leverage to counsel compliance” with the law).
202. Koniak, supra note 81, at 1237 (noting that lawyers for Enron were
responsible for “structuring bogus deals, vouching for nonexistent sales, [and] writing
whitewash reports to keep the sheriff fooled and away”); see also Enron and the
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participating in some clients’ financial frauds, rather than seeking to
prevent the frauds, particularly after the Enron scandal in the early
twenty-first century.203 In light of the possibility of lawyer complicity
in corporate fraud, some commentators placed value on the power of
public knowledge to discourage fraud over the power of corporate
lawyers to prevent it. This is especially true where lawyers may find
themselves too close to the perpetrators of the frauds to remain
objective.204 As one commentator has summarized:
“The critical issue now being debated is whether, as a matter of
public policy, the need to protect the investing public by imposing a
duty on attorneys to reveal evidence of corporate misfeasance and
fraud should outweigh the traditional protections afforded to the
attorney-client relationship.”205

This perspective takes a more skeptical approach to the attorneyclient relationship, suggesting that an attorney’s strict ethical duty of
confidentiality is fundamentally at odds with the protection of the
investing public rather than a necessary tool for its protection.
The relationship between the social goals of confidentiality
protection and public investor protection is convoluted at best.
Untangling the two requires a deep understanding of the lawyerclient relationship, the functioning and daily operation of corporate
entities, the impact of ongoing financial fraud on the economy, and
the effect of whistleblowing on such fraud as a whole. The difficulty
experienced by individuals in striking the proper balance between the
two interests (i.e., in making the proper “goal choice” decision)
underscores the important role of institutions in the rule making
process.
Individuals are only capable of mastering so much
information in complex social processes and relationships, such as

Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14. For a response from the legal profession,
see Fox, supra note 196, at 1243.
203. Enron and the Lawyers, supra note 202.
204. For a discussion of the close lawyer-client friendship that often develops
during the course of representation, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW OF
ETHICS AND LAWYERING 20–21(3d ed. 1999).
205. Beck, supra note 116, at 898. The ABA Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility appeared to accept this formulation of the issue in its 2003 report.
That report stated in part:
The Task Force believed that where the client abuses the client-lawyer
relationship by using the lawyer’s services to commit a crime or fraud that
results in substantial economic harm to another, the policy of protecting
confidentiality is outweighed by the policy of protecting the interests of
society and the professional integrity of the lawyer.
AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2013, at 139 (Art Garwin ed., 2013).
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those at issue discussed in this Part. As such, larger and more
complex decision-making entities (i.e., public institutions) are needed
to deal with such issues.206 According to ICT, the role of the
individual in this decision-making process is not the untangling and
mastering of these inter-related social interests, but the selection of
the institution that is most qualified for that role.207 Thus, the purpose
of this Note’s discussion of the two social interests underlying
whistleblowing regulation is to help inform individuals’ decision
regarding which institution is “best” to regulate those social interests.
C.

The Potential Regulating Institutions for Attorney
Whistleblowing Regulations

1.

The State Judiciary

Because state judicial branches dominate the current system of
attorney behavior regulation, no institutional analysis would be
complete without a comparison of the state judiciary to other
potential regulatory institutions.208 While the structures of state
judiciaries’ attorney regulation systems vary from state to state, many
of their most salient institutional characteristics are shared in
common. Most basic of these characteristics is the fact that most
states’ high court holds the primary responsibility for the enactment
of rules of professional responsibility.209 Therefore, this Note treats
the “state judiciary” label as synonymous with the typical state high
court. Notably, all high court judges are lawyers, and most supreme
court justices must face election to gain or keep their jobs.210

2.

State Legislature

State legislatures are becoming increasingly involved in many areas
of lawyer regulation.211 While state legislatures have not yet sought to
enact rules explicitly regulating attorney whistleblowing, legislatures’
practical and historical connection to the issues underlying attorney

206. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
208. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1185 (starting an institutional analysis with the
state courts as the primary regulatory institution in this area).
209. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that conduct rules must first be
adopted by state courts before becoming effective).
210. Barton, supra note 34, at 1185–86.
211. See id. at 1171 n.15.
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regulation make them a logical choice for comparison.212 For
example, scholars have noted that the current system of attorney
regulation was not always dominated by state judiciaries as it is now;
state legislatures originally played a much larger role.213 Scholars
have argued that the shift to the current, judiciary-centric model of
attorney regulation occurred as a result of “history and tradition”
rather than purely reasoned public policy.214 Because the decision to
entrust attorney behavior regulation to state judiciaries was not made
as a conscious policy decision, ex post facto institutional choice
analysis is a necessary part of any argument either for, or against, the
judiciary-controlled status quo.215
III. A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MICROANALYSIS OF
STATE COURTS AND LEGISLATURES REGARDING THEIR
RELATIVE COMPETENCE TO DRAFT ATTORNEYWHISTLEBLOWING REGULATIONS
Part III of this Note presents a side-by-side comparison of three
types of institutional characteristics that affect state high courts and
legislatures’ ability to create attorney-whistleblowing regulations.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine which institution is the
“best” for this specific regulatory role. First, this Part will compare
the two institutions’ expertise. Next, this Part will discuss their
impartiality and independence, and finally it will discuss their
institutional “accountability” and the public access they provide to
their decision-making process.
The determination of which institution is the “best” for a given
regulatory role is heavily influenced by the choice of characteristics
along which the institutions are compared.216 An institutional
comparison that values constitutional authority may arrive at a
different result than a comparison which values accountability or
transparency.217 For the results to be significant, therefore, the
compared institutional characteristics should be ones relevant to the

212. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram Toward A History of the Legalization of
American Legal Ethics—II the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 211
(2002) (noting that “the prevalence of legislative regulation of lawyers remained the
accepted arrangement throughout much of the nineteenth century”).
213. See, e.g., id. at 211–12.
214. See Kaufman, supra note 5; Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra
note 5, at 175 (noting that there was not much public interest in the rules of
professional conduct during the early years of its development).
215. See Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 175.
216. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1177.
217. See id.
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specific regulatory task in question. In the case of attorneywhistleblowing regulation, the regulatory task involves the balancing
of potentially conflicting needs for lawyer-client trust and investor
protection. This Note’s analysis will compare state legislatures to
state judiciaries along three groups of characteristics which impact
institutions ability to balance these interests: (1) substantive and
procedural expertise, (2) impartiality, and (3) accountability and
public access.218
Regarding substantive expertise, this Note compares the two
institutions’ knowledge and experience in the relevant fields of
lawyer-client confidentiality and investor protection.219 This expertise
(or lack thereof) has a significant impact on the institutions’ ability to
regulate attorney whistle-blowing for two reasons. One reason is
effectiveness: if an institution is unfamiliar with the subject matter, it
will not be able to monitor that area effectively or achieve desired
regulatory results.220 Another reason is efficiency: “[t]he more
familiar policymakers are with the regulated industry, the less time
they spend investigating and fact-finding, thus increasing
efficiency.”221
The procedural expertise category will compare the institutions’
relative abilities to promulgate rules in general. It is important to
note that the procedural expertise category compares the legislative
ability of legislators to the legislative ability of judges. A focus on the
legislative ability of courts is relatively unusual in institutional choice
analysis, which typically focuses on courts’ judicial capabilities.222 The
distinction between a court’s legislative and adjudicative functions is
significant because many of the characteristics typically ascribed to
courts—such as impartiality, independence, and reliance on
218. While these are specific group categories compared in institutional analyses of
attorney behavior regulation, the broad outlines of chosen characteristics have more
in common than not. See id. at 1177–78 (focusing on the institutional characteristics
of rent-seeking (or self-interest), procedural efficiency, and democratization); Mehta,
supra note 3, at 66 (focusing on authority, competence, expertise, and impartiality);
see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 4 (2007) (listing
impartiality, accountability, transparency, and deliberation as four of the core values
which democratic institutions should serve).
219. In describing particular institutional qualities, this Note relies heavily on
previous institutional choice studies and the observations of leading scholars in the
field.
220. Mehta, supra note 3, at 83–84 (noting that the “‘best’ set of professional
responsibility rules will be promulgated when the drafters of the rule have some
expertise in drafting these rules and knowing which rules will most likely produce the
‘best’ outcome”).
221. Barton, supra note 34, at 1184.
222. See id. at 1174.
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precedent—relate to courts’ adjudicative role and legislative role in
very different (and sometimes contradictory) ways.223 Under the
“impartiality” characteristic, this Note compares the potentially
detrimental effects of regulatory capture and institutional
interdependence on the two institutions. And finally, “accountability
and access to the public” compares the two institutions’ relative
accountability to the public, the transparency of their decision-making
processes, and the access they provide into their decision-making
process.
For its discussion of the specific qualities possessed by state
judiciaries and legislatures, this Note draws on the observations of
previous institutional choice analyses which compare their capacity to
regulate attorney behavior in general.224 In particular, this Note
builds on the observations of Professor Benjamin Barton’s 2003
study, which concluded that institutional comparison of courts,
legislatures, and the market favored legislative control of the legal
industry as a whole.225 Taking into account the current challenges in
applying unifying observations across a diversifying legal industry,
this Note analyzes and further develops these observations as they
relate specifically to the regulation of attorney-whistleblowing, rather
than attorney behavior in general.
A. Institutional Expertise
It is generally accepted that “the ‘best’ set of professional
responsibility rules will be promulgated when the drafters of the rule
have some expertise in drafting these rules and knowing which rules
will most likely produce the best outcome.”226 Thus, while lack of
institutional expertise can be offset by strength in other areas,
expertise in the subject being regulated remains a substantial factor in
an institution’s capacity for successful regulation. The related
“procedural expertise” category analyzes the institution’s relative
technical competence in the rulemaking process itself. It is important
to keep in mind that this category compares the legislative capacity of
legislatures to the legislative capacity of courts.

223. See id.
224. See generally id.
225. Id. at 1241–42.
226. Mehta, supra note 3, at 83–84 (noting that “academics and thought-leaders
consider ‘institutional expertise’ an important factor, if not, the most important
factor, in considering the appropriate actor to spearhead a government action”).
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State Judiciary

Substantive Expertise

State supreme court judges have been described as “generalists”
whose expertise is in the “methodology of the common law.”227 This
general expertise deals with the technical development of the
structure of law rather than any particular substantive field.228 That
being said, judges on state supreme courts are all former lawyers, and
often have gained substantial experience in the practice of law prior
to joining the bench.229 In part because of this fact, “[t]here has been
a long-standing assumption that the courts have particular expertise
in knowing what the proper scope of attorney conduct rules should
entail.”230 Some scholars suggest that this expertise includes a general
understanding of the legal market, and the effects that a courts’
regulations would have on that market.231
The assumption of judicial expertise over attorney behavior is
particularly strong regarding litigation and trial conduct.232 This is
logical, as the focus of a judge’s career is overseeing of the litigation
process itself.233 Since the early twentieth century, however, the
central role of litigation-based practice has been steadily shrinking in
relation to other practice areas.234 The industry has diversified to
where a significant percentage of lawyers rarely see the inside of a
courtroom.235 Thus, there are growing areas of the law in which many
experienced state high court justices have little practical exposure.236

227. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 592 (1986).
228. See id.
229. Barton, supra note 34, at 1196–97.
230. Mehta, supra note 3, at 87. While Mehta’s study focuses on federal rather
than state judicial expertise, justices of state high courts are viewed in this context
with similarly high regard. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210. State trial courts, not
dealt with in this Note, may be another story entirely.
231. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210.
232. See id. at 1210 n.161 (“Most justices come to the bench from a litigation
background. Their knowledge of the practices of other areas of specialty, such as tax
or transactional law, might be limited.”).
233. See id.
234. Charles Wolfram, supra note 103, at 5.
235. Id. (“The average lawyer no longer spends very much time in court. In fact,
the great majority of lawyers would starve if they had to make their living out of
court appearances.”).
236. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 34, at 1247–50; Stanley Sporkin, The Need for
Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 149, 149 (1993) (asserting that additional ethical codes are necessary for
nonlitigators).
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Further minimizing judicial expertise in this context is the lawyercentric worldview that often results from judges’ natural connection
to the legal community.237 This limited judicial worldview makes it
more likely that judges’ generalized institutional expertise covers
confidentiality aspects of attorney-whistleblower regulations in the
broadest sense, but may not cover the economic concerns implicated
by such rules.238 While some judges may have such broad-based
expertise based on personal experience, this is likely not the case in
general; the election process by which most judges on state supreme
courts obtain and keep their jobs does not select based on expertise in
these areas.239
Rather, politics and other non-merit-based
considerations often come into play.240 Because of this, state
judiciaries as a whole are not likely to possess substantive expertise
regarding both attorney confidentiality and public investor
protection—the two topics most relevant to attorney-whistleblowing
regulations. 241

b.

Procedural Expertise

Maintenance of a state high court’s rulemaking expertise is
motivated in part by a desire to meet the needs of the courts on which
those judges serve: when the lawyers practicing before them meet

237. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (noting that judges’ prior experience in
the legal system “is likely to align their preferences with the preferences [and
interests] of the legal community as a whole. Consequently, judges are likely to view
procedural rules that maximize the demand for lawyers’ services as socially
desirable . . . ”).
238. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 158 (arguing that
the further removed a specialty is from court, the less expertise judges will have in
that field). While the argument for lack of judicial expertise in particular areas of law
is a broad generalization across state court systems, there may be exceptions to the
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir.
2013) (noting that New York’s rule of professional conduct governing attorney
whistleblowing, N.Y. Rule 1.6(b), is consistent with both economic and legal-industry
interests); R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities:
Creating a Culture of Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L.
REV. 829, 854 (2003) (noting the expertise of Delaware courts in corporate law
matters).
239. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1185–86.
240. See id. (arguing that because most state judges face election, state courts
“typically are much less independent from voter sentiment than federal courts”).
241. See Macey, supra note 237, at 643 (noting that judges have substantive
expertise in procedural norms, but little substantive expertise in finance and
economics).
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higher standards of conduct, the judges’ own jobs become easier.242
However, state high court judges’ primary role is adjudicating, not
legislating. Because of this, judges spend far less of their time and
energy on developing the rules of professional conduct than they do
on adjudicating the common law cases before them.243
The judicial system’s natural focus on adjudication has a negative
effect on its procedural rulemaking expertise for several reasons.
First, fewer resources devoted to rulemaking means less opportunity
to develop institutional capacity to make rules, and creates a greater
motivation to delegate the task of rule-drafting to others.244 Because
this lack of procedural capacity has led courts to delegate their
rulemaking role to the bar to such an extent that state high courts
now play only a nominal role in the rule drafting process, much of the
substantive expertise that the judges may have otherwise brought to
bear on the subject of ethical duties of confidentiality has been
nullified.245
Further, to the extent that high courts do develop their own drafts
of conduct regulations, an analysis of their regulatory procedure is
hampered by the opacity of the judicial regulatory process. In
general, judges’ internal deliberation processes are not well
publicized, and are not well understood by the public.246 This not only
inhibits a full analysis of state courts’ procedural expertise, but also
detracts from the democratic nature of its rulemaking process.247

242. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210 (“[T]he regulation of lawyers is at least
partially motivated by a desire to meet the needs of the courts, and supreme courts
are in an excellent position to determine those needs.”).
243. See id. at 1207 (arguing that judges would be expected to delegate away as
much of their rulemaking role as possible in order to “preserve leisure and to
maximize the time and energy they have to spend on their primary job, deciding
cases”).
244. See id.
245. Id.; see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that state high
courts’ failure to take a more active role in attorney conduct regulation has led
practitioners to treat the rules as “non-authoritative”).
246. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 104 (noting the public’s difficulty in
determining how judges make their decisions).
247. For a discussion of the accountability of state courts’ rulemaking procedure,
see supra Part II.C.
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State Legislatures

State Legislatures’ Substantive Expertise

State legislatures have a substantial disadvantage in institutional
For one thing, a substantial proportion of state
expertise.248
legislators are non-lawyers.249 Term limits and resource constraints
also generally preclude any individual state legislature from
developing expertise in specialized areas like attorney regulation over
long periods of time.250 On the other hand, as Professor Barton notes,
“regulating lawyers is not rocket science. State legislatures certainly
can handle debates over the unauthorized practice of law or the scope
of lawyer confidentiality without complicated or technical
explanations.”251 Thus, while the average state legislator likely does
not have substantial expertise in lawyer confidentiality, legislators
should be able to handle debates covering the topic without
significant trouble.

b.

State Legislatures’ Procedural Expertise

Regarding the importance of procedural expertise, “it seems
natural to prefer the institution that has been designed for, and is
practiced in, regulating rather than adjudicating.”252 Thus, where the
state supreme courts’ lack of procedural expertise inhibits their
capacity to apply their substantive expertise in attorney conduct
regulation,253 this situation is reversed regarding state legislatures.
Legislatures’ strong procedural tool-kit and expertise in rulemaking
more than make up for their lack of substantive expertise in any
particular area of law.
As one scholar notes, “[t]he legislative
process provides many opportunities for gathering relevant
information and deliberating about it.”254 For example, legislatures
can hold formal committee meetings and floor debates, as well as
informal discussions with constituents, lobbyists, officers of the

248. Barton, supra note 34 at 1227.
249. Id. at 1224.
250. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the
Role of the States, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 491, 509 n.70 (1988).
251. Barton, supra note 34, at 1228.
252. Id. at 1224.
253. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
254. Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government,
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 421, 435 (1998).
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executive branch, and subdivisions of state governments.255 They can
also conduct studies, and hear testimony from experts in a given
field.256 Use of these tools over a period of weeks or months helps to
ensure better drafting of legislation and “builds institutional
knowledge throughout the legislature and the expertise of at least a
few legislators and staff members.”257 As a result, “the legislative
process reduces the dangers of manipulation, misunderstanding, or
misguided and unworkable policies. If a consensus cannot emerge, at
least a compromise might. And if nothing productive results in the
short run, the legislative door remains open in the future.”258
Consequently, where legislatures may lack substantive knowledge
of their own regarding a particular subject, the deliberate
consideration of information “carefully gathered” from outside
sources may provide legislators with the background necessary to pass
an informed bill on the subject.259 Thus, where a lack of substantive
knowledge leads state high courts to delegate the regulation-drafting
task into the hands of lawyers themselves, legislatures are able to
obtain the necessary substantive knowledge without delegating the
rulemaking task to the legal industry.
B.

Impartiality

The next characteristic to be compared, impartiality, analyzes the
impact of regulatory capture on each institution. “Agency capture”
refers to the tendency of a regulating institution to submit to the
lobbying influence of the regulated industry.260 The more influence an
industry has over the creation of the rules governing its own
operation, the more those rules will be biased in favor of that
industry—even at the expense of the rest of society.261 In the context
of attorney-whistleblower regulations, regulatory capture takes the

255. See id. (discussing several procedural tools available to state legislatures).
256. See id.
257. Id. at 436. Considerable attention is often given to information collected using
these tools. Id. But c.f., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona’s Corporate

Attorney-Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to
Regulate the Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 452–53 (2006) (discussing a law
passed by Arizona’s state legislature where the legislature heard little testimony from
opponents, considered no empirical data, and did not adequately understand the
topic before the law’s enactment).
258. Frickey, supra note 254, at 436.
259. See id.
260. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1179.
261. See id. at 1178 (“[G]overnment regulation and regulators frequently serve the
interests of a regulated industry ahead of the public at large . . . .”).

1010

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

form of the regulating institution delegating the primary role in
drafting conduct rules into the hands of the regulated industry itself.262

1.

State High Courts

As a starting point for analysis of the regulatory capture of state
supreme courts, two observations must be noted: first, all state high
court judges are lawyers; and second, most high court judges must
face election to gain or keep their jobs.263 As lawyers themselves,
judges may be partial to the legal industry at the expense of other
sectors of society.264 And because elections for judicial office are
typically of low salience and visibility in the public eye, judges often
rely on the organized bar to promote their election campaigns and
lobby on their behalf.265
Further, many of the institutional characteristics that help maintain
the state judiciary’s neutral, independent status as a dispute
adjudicator do not protect the institution from lobbying and selfinterest in its legislative rule-making role.266 In its adjudicative role,
for example, a court’s power is limited to ruling on the facts of the
case before it. Judges are bound by past precedent, seek to conform
to norms of judicial behavior, and are generally required to make
their logic and reasoning public through written opinions.267 These
qualities do not play a role in the legislation of attorney conduct rules,
making state high courts far more open to self-interested lobbying in
their legislative rulemaking capacity than in their adjudicative
capacity.
This lack of institutional independence, combined with the courts’
tendencies to delegate rulemaking to bar associations, means that
court-approved ethics rules will inevitably be developed with
significant legal industry and bar association input.268 The courts’ role
in the process is merely to “supervise the limits of bar association

262. See id. at 1208, 1218 (noting the circumstances under which the legal industry
has exercised control over both courts’ and legislatures’ attempts to regulate that
industry).
263. See id. at 1185–86.
264. See id. at 1189 (noting some of the shared interests uniting judges and
practicing lawyers). Judges’ status as lawyers plays a role in analyzing their potential
expertise as well as potential for regulatory capture by the legal industry. See supra
Part II.A.
265. See id. at 1201–02.
266. See id. at 1198–1200.
267. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective
Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 968–69 (1995).
268. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 110.
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power-to accept the valid aspects of the proposals, but to avoid
‘capture’ by the bar.”269 However, the ability of a state court to avoid
capture in this process decreases dramatically when the courts’
position on a proposed rule or policy is antithetical to the organized
bar’s core principles—its “normative vision” of how the law should be
practiced.270
Regulation of attorneys’ ethical duty of confidentiality is one
rulemaking area where a state judiciary’s interests may come in
conflict with the core “normative vision” of the bar, further limiting
its institutional independence.271 This is in part because the concept
of confidentiality is so central to the identity of the bar that it views
an attack on confidentiality protections as an attack on the profession
as a whole.272 In fact, “it is confidentiality, and particularly the duty to
keep client confidences from the state, more often than any other
norm, that triggers the obligation to resist competing state norms and
that justifies the passage of ethics rules to ‘undo’ state
pronouncements.”273 Because of the heightened attention and
support that the bar provides to confidentiality protections, “the
eventual confidentiality rules enacted by state judiciaries would
reflect the will and influence of the regulated industry to a much
greater extent than in other areas of regulation.”274 Thus, a state
judiciary’s ability to maintain independence from the target of its
confidentiality regulations—the legal industry—is practically
nonexistent in this context.

2.

State Legislatures

Similarly, state legislatures have been called the “poster children”
for regulatory capture by lobbying groups.275 Legislatures rely on
special interest groups for campaign finance, public support, and
input on particular areas of legislation.276 However, because relatively
few state legislatures are practicing lawyers, and legislatures do not

269. Id.
270. See Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1389, 1391–92 (1992); see also Dzienkowski, supra note 111, at 86 (listing “core
principles” prioritized by the bar, including “the lawyer’s duty to disclose another
lawyer’s misconduct,” as well as loyalty, confidentiality, and “communication in light
of a lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client”).
271. Koniak, supra note 270, at 1391.
272. Id. at 1427.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1217.
276. See id.
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rely on lawyers for their day-to-day functioning, legislators do not
share the same tendency for regulatory capture by the legal industry,
as seen in state court systems.277 Rather, state legislatures are “open
to lobbying and contributions from all comers and have no natural
reason to expect or rely particularly on the bar for political
support.”278 Thus, where lawyers may wield undue influence over the
rulemaking process managed by state high courts, lawyers find
themselves placed on more equal footing with the rest of the public
when dealing with state legislatures.279
C.

Accountability and Accessibility

The “accountability and accessibility” category compares several
aspects of the institutions’ democratic nature, such as their
responsiveness to the needs of the public, and the transparency of
their decision-making process.280 These concerns are important for
effective and efficient regulation of attorney behavior in general for
several reasons.281 On an ideological level, open and accessible
institutions further the constitutional aims of maintaining a
functioning “deliberative democracy.”282 On a practical level, a more
open and democratic regulatory process helps to prevent regulatory
capture by particular interest groups and increases economic
efficiency.283

1.

State High Courts

In general, state courts are not lobbied by the public.284 Rather,
they are organized specifically to minimize the effect of public
opinion and lobbying on judges.285 For example, “[t]he public cannot
just stop by a justice’s chambers to complain about lawyer regulation,
nor are justices provided with staff to respond to constituent

See id. at 1220.
Id. at 1219.
See id. at 1220–21.
See id. at 1177–78.
See id.
Id. at 1177 n.36; see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors:
Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 264 (2005) (arguing that deliberativeness,
representativeness, and accessibility are three of the most salient characteristics of
the American legislative process that give it its democratic legitimacy).
283. Barton, supra note 34, at 1178–80 (discussing the impact of an institution’s
accessibility on its potential for regulatory capture).
284. See id. at 1201–02.
285. See id. at 1201.
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complaints or lobbying.”286 Because of this, the general population
can exert very little influence on the decision-making process of state
court judges.
While such independence and immunity from public opinion is
lauded in the context of resolving legal disputes, these qualities
become “problematic” when dealing with lawyer regulation.287 Not
only does judicial inaccessibility detract from the democratic
legitimacy of the process, but it also skews the balance of influence
over the rule-making process dramatically in favor of lawyers
themselves.288 This is true in part because lawyers have natural access
to judges through their day-to-day work as well as through bar
associations on which both lawyers and justices serve.289 This fact
makes state court judges “an easy target for formal and informal
lawyer lobbying.”290 Combined with the fact that judges pride
themselves on their isolation from the influences of other parties and
public opinion, it would appear that lawyers have much greater access
and influence over the process than any other group.291

2.

State Legislatures

Compared to state courts, “legislatures are open by design.”292
Individual legislators generally make an affirmative effort to make
themselves available to their constituents for contact and comment on
legislative functions.293 This quality is rooted deep in the “ethos” of
American democracy, which generally includes “following the will of
the electorate” and necessarily requires a broad range of input from
the voting public.294 According to this democratic ethos, “all are
deemed to have a right to know about and influence decision making”
in the American legislative process.295 Rulemaking by judges—
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 96 (noting that “[o]ne should not casually
dismiss the validity of the perceptions that rule-making courts have been captured by
bar committees and that the professional codes reflect the interests of the legal
profession”).
289. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the
Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 458 (2008) (“[T]he vast majority of judges
were practicing attorneys before taking the bench. Judges are frequently bar
association members.”).
290. Id. at 459.
291. Id.
292. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1222.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Heminway, supra note 282, at 271.
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trained to isolate themselves from the public—thus provides far less
opportunity for public input or dissent.
D. Conclusion of the Comparative Institutional Choice
Microanalysis
As is suggested by this Note’s hypothetical application of
comparative institutional microanalysis, the status quo of judiciary
and lawyer dominated legal industry regulation is not the “best”
method for the creation of conduct rules relating specifically to
attorney-whistleblowing. State courts, far more than legislatures,
tend to defer to the whims of the legal industry in creating favorable
rules for its regulation; this effect is compounded when dealing with
regulation of core values of the legal industry, such as confidentiality.
With state courts in control of attorney confidentiality and
whistleblowing regulation, the regulatory process substantially favors
the legal industry over the public and the wider economy. If
legislatures were given greater control of attorney-whistleblowing
regulation, on the other hand, rule-makers would have use of the
organized bar’s expertise in the form of expert testimony and reports,
but would also have greater capacity to weigh evidence from other
facets of society for or against particular regulatory language favored
by the bar.
In addition, because state high courts are organized to minimize
the effects of public opinion on the decision-making process, the
public has little influence over the courts’ legislative role in the
attorney-whistleblowing-regulation process. This lack of public
influence leads to a relatively undemocratic rulemaking process that
prioritizes the interests of practicing lawyers rather than the needs of
the economy or the public at large. Lodging rulemaking authority
with a more publicly accountable institution like state legislatures
would ensure that ethics rules are based on public need rather than
lawyer self-interest.296
E.

Further Narrowing the Context of Institutional Microanalysis
Raises Questions for Future Study

Even applied to the factual context of attorney-whistleblowing
regulations, however, the results of a comparative institutional

296. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the
Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587,
2599 (2014).
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analysis are far from definitive. The results of individual institutional
choice microanalyses may vary depending on the choice of
institutions discussed, the relevant characteristics compared, and the
broadness or specificity of the context in which the institutions are
being compared. Here, the chosen context is a “mid-level” of
specificity, analyzing a sub-category of attorney conduct regulation—
attorney whistleblowing regulations regarding client fraud.297 On the
other hand, the chosen categories of institutions to be compared
(state courts and state legislatures) actually aggregate fifty
independent court systems and fifty independent legislative systems
into two overarching categories.298 While many of their practical
differences are immaterial to this Note’s comparison, several states do
possess courts and legislatures whose relevant characteristics vary
significantly from those of other states.
In particular, state courts in New York and Delaware differ
dramatically from their counterparts in other states regarding their
expertise in economic issues.299 On one hand, it is widely accepted
that judges lack significant expertise when it comes to the regulation
of complex non-legal activities like investor protection or financial
fraud prevention.300 However, Delaware goes against this trend, and
Delaware courts have in fact been noted for their expertise in
business and corporate matters.301 Additionally, New York’s courts’
balancing of corporate and legal-industry interests has, unlike the

297. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
298. To demonstrate the impact of aggregating all state judiciaries and all state
courts into two categories, compare this Note’s analysis to Professor Ted Schneyer’s
2006 comparative institutional microanalysis of Arizona courts and legislatures
regarding their relative competence to regulate attorney confidentiality. See
generally Schneyer, supra note 257 (analyzing institutional characteristics unique to
Arizona and its politics, and concluding that based on a comparison of such
characteristics, Arizona’s state courts were best qualified to regulate attorney
confidentiality).
299. See supra Part II.B (discussing the impact of a courts’ economic expertise on
its ability to regulate attorney-whistleblowing behavior).
300. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 34, at 1210 (noting that “justices are more
familiar with the lawyer’s perspective than with the perspectives of other players in
the system”); Lawrence Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger
Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 212 (noting
that federal judges bring limited economics expertise to the bench).
301. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (“Delaware chancery
judges are known for their expertise in business matters, and the court has developed
a reputation for its sophistication in corporate law.”).
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balancing of other state courts, received the stamp of approval of the
federal judiciary.302
Several characteristics unique to Delaware make its distinctive
economic and corporate-law expertise possible. For example, a
substantial proportion of the country’s corporations are chartered in
Delaware.303 Because of this, many Delaware judges see a high
concentration of corporate cases relative to other types of cases.304
The high concentration enhances the economic expertise of Delaware
courts in two ways: first, judges themselves obtain expertise from the
substantial proportion of corporate-law case before them.305 Second,
judges are able to obtain significant corporate-law expertise by
working as attorneys in the Delaware legal system prior to reaching
the bench in the first place.306 The fact that Delaware’s high court
selects its members based on merit rather than popular election only
adds to the concentration of expert judges on the Delaware bench.307
While the economic expertise of judges in New York is not as
prominent as the expertise of judges in Delaware, New York state
courts have nevertheless been recognized for competence in the area
of commercial law.308 New York courts’ expertise likely derives in
large part from the state’s large overall population and major
commercial hub—New York City. As one scholar notes, states with
large populations see a broader range of cases, and are more likely to
develop specialized case law in particular substantive areas over
time.309 While simply being a large state may not be enough to
guarantee specialization in a particular substantive area of law, the
presence of a major commercial hub like New York City also creates
a concentration of commercial cases in New York courts in and

302. United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2013)
(noting that N.Y. RPC 1.6(b) is consistent with both economic and legal-industry
interests).
303. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589 (1990).
304. Id. (“Because of Delaware’s small size and its many corporate charters,
Delaware judges see a high proportion of corporate cases, and develop corporate
expertise.”).
305. Id.
306. Id. (“[B]ecause corporate lawyers are prominent in the Delaware bar, many
judges come to the bench with corporate law experience.”).
307. See Fisch, supra note 301, at 1094.
308. D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and
Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 842 (2007) (noting the “remarkable
and varied commercial expertise” of New York’s specialized commercial courts).
309. Black, supra note 303, at 589.
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around the city.310 Further institutional analysis comparing those
states institutions will be necessary, however, in order to better
understand the effects that these unique qualities have on the two
states’ attorney-regulating institutions.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of the drafting of confidentiality and
attorney-whistleblower regulations, public policy considerations have
taken a back seat to the influences of political compromise, selfinterest, and reactions to public opinion or sudden economic events.
While the resulting regulations, such as New York Rule of Conduct
1.6 and SEC Rule 205.3, are not necessarily rendered inefficient or
ineffective as a result, little effort has been expended by the relevant
decision-makers to determine whether or not these rules are, in fact,
as effective as they could be from a public policy perspective.
To this end, institutional choice analysis has been used to develop
at least some public policy support for the rules throughout the course
of their development. However, this analysis has been conducted
only in a cursory and “intuitive” fashion, and could greatly benefit
from a more rigorous comparative institutional microanalysis of the
public policy benefits of particular rules. Through further analysis
focusing on the public policy concerns surrounding regulations, like
those governing attorney confidentiality and whistleblowing, rule
makers will be able to draft regulations that are more consistent in
their application and more effective in achieving their public policy
goals.

310. Ira Pilchen, New York Tries Commercial Cases Separately, 76 JUDICATURE
266 (1993) (noting that New York’s specialized commercial courts are assigned cases
arising primarily out of Manhattan).

